Introduction
Government involvement in agricultural R&D is justified if the benefits exceed the costs. Does the private sector neglect socially profitable investments? So-called market failures in R&D can result if inventors are unable to fully appropriate the returns to their inventions-if "free-riders" can adopt new technology and benefit from it without having to contribute to the costs of research. In agriculture, in particular, it seems likely that, absent government intervention, the private sector will invest too little in certain types of R&D, and there is a strong in-principle case for government to intervene either to improve private incentives or, more directly, to fund or undertake research.
In the United States, both state and federal governments are extensively involved in agricultural R&D. Perhaps the most obvious, and arguably the main form of involvement is the government production of agricultural science-in government labs or in public Universitiesusing general government revenues. This intervention is justified both in principle and by the evidence that the rates of return to public agricultural research have been very high, even with very extensive government intervention to correct the private-sector under-investment in agricultural R&D (e.g., see Alston et al. 2000) . This suggests that the government intervention to date has been inadequate; that the United States could have profitably spent much more on agricultural R&D.
These observations apply to differing extents to different elements of U.S. agricultural R&D in aggregate in terms of fields of science, locations of production, or commodity orientation of research. This paper considers public funding for R&D directed to specialty crops.
Specific questions to be addressed include whether R&D for specialty crops has been underfunded, both in absolute terms and relative to other crops and agriculture more generally. First, evidence is presented on past funding patterns and on rates of return; second, implications of that evidence in the context of specialty crops production are discussed.
Trends in U.S. Public Agricultural R&D
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In the United States, agricultural research is funded by the federal government through a variety of mechanisms. Historically the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has been the primary federal government agency channeling funds to the State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAESs), but that is now changing.
2 In 1970, the USDA disbursed almost 70 percent of the federal funds flowing to the SAESs, but by 2004 that had declined to less than 50 percent, with more than half the federal funds now being disbursed by a wide range of federal agencies, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and others. The USDA conducts intramural research, mainly through the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) in addition to distributing federal funds to the SAESs through a combination of formula funds, grants, and contracts.
Long-Term Trends
In 1889, shortly after the Hatch Act was passed, federal and state spending appropriations totaled $1.12 million. Over a century later, in 2004 the public agricultural R&D enterprise had grown to almost $4.2 billion, an annual rate of growth of 7.7 percent in nominal terms and 4.1 percent in real (i.e., inflation adjusted) terms. offset by increased federal support for SAES research. Support for extension has also stagnated in real terms, especially federal government support. In this paper we focus on public spending on agricultural research, without specific reference to extension although many of the same points would apply to extension. In addition, unless specific reference is made to private research spending, it is being set aside from the discussion for now. 5 Of interest is the extent of public support for research into specialty crops and how that has fared in the context of the generally evolving patterns of federal and state government support for agricultural R&D.
Funding for R&D on Specialty Crops
As shown above, aggregate public spending on agricultural R&D can be broken down between intramural USDA spending and SAES spending (some of which is financed from federal funds), state by state. The USDA also compiles information and reports spending on between specialty crops and all other crops. 5 In the United States, private agricultural research spending more than doubled in real terms from 1970 to 2000, and private research spending now exceeds public research spending (according to unpublished and updated data originally published in Klotz, Fuglie and Pray 1995) . This growth has been associated with improvements in intellectual property rights (especially pertaining to plant varieties), and modern biotechnology, among other things.
Commodity Orientation of U.S. Public Agricultural Research Spending
The focus here is on public support for R&D on specialty crops. The Specialty Crop Specialty crop commodities vary substantially in terms of the size of the industry and the size of the corresponding public agricultural research budget, both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the industry. In this section we examine these patterns in depth. Before doing that, to provide some context, we consider the allocation of the total public agricultural research budget among different types of research. Figure 4 and Table 2 show the allocation of total U.S.
public agricultural R&D spending (including both USDA intramural and SAES expenditure) over time between commodity-specific and other (i.e., non-commodity specific) research. Table   2 also allocates the research directed towards specific commodities between crops versus 6 A subset of specialty crops are designated as "Mediterranean" crops, which have been defined by the Cal-Med consortium as including olives and olive oil; tree nuts; grapes and wine; raisins; vegetables-processed and fresh; citrus-processed and fresh; and stone fruits. The Mediterranean crop definition does not include nursery and floriculture, which are included in specialty crops, and it is unclear whether processed fruits and vegetables are included in the specialty crop definition contained in the 2004 Competitiveness Act and HR 6193. livestock research; among the major categories within crops (i.e., grains and oilseeds, pasture and forage, other crop, and specialty crops); and then among the main categories of specialty crops (i.e., fruits and nuts, vegetables, and ornamentals). The top half of [ Figure 4 : Allocation of U.S. Public Agricultural R&D Spending, 1975 and [ these two effects, the specialty crops share of total public agricultural research spending was fairly stable, between 14 and 16 percent over the 25 years 1980 through 2004. In turn, the allocation of specialty crops research among major categories was also fairly stable over the 25 year period, with roughly equal shares going to fruit and nuts and to vegetables (13 to 16 percent each out of the 35 percent spent on crops research) and a smaller share going to ornamentals (about 5 to 6 percent of the 35 percent).
Congruence of U.S. Research Spending and Value of Production
Further insights can be gleaned by considering the commodity-by-commodity congruence between research funding and the value of production. In 2004, the aggregate commodity-specific (i.e., crop and livestock) research spending of $2,509 million (including $668 million of USDA intramural spending) represented 1.06 percent of the gross value of agricultural sales, compared with an overall agricultural research intensity (i.e., including all commodity and non-commodity specific research) of 1.53 percent. This compares with an overall intensity of 0.72 percent in 1975.
In Table 1 there are no readily discernible differences in agricultural research intensity ratios between specialty and field crops. One third (or 3 of 9 commodity areas) of the field crops reported in Table 1 had intensities higher than 1.5 percent, and roughly the same share of specialty crops (9 of 23) had intensities higher than 1.5 percent. However, a multitude of minor specialty crops have been omitted from this table. Table 2 ) that a sizable, and of late growing, share of public agricultural R&D does not target specific commodities. The U.S. public agricultural research agenda has increasingly focused on concerns such as food safety, food security, and the environmental implications of agriculture that have little if any impact on enhancing or even maintaining farm-level productivity.
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[ Figure 5 : Agricultural Research Intensities, 1970 Figure 6 provides more commodity-specific detail on the pattern of agricultural output and the amount and intensity of public research spending for 2004. The figures for total spending over time on crop-specific research were broken down between SAES and USDA intramural research spending, and the agricultural research intensities were computed by dividing the total crop-specific research spending and its SAES and USDA intramural elements by the gross value of sales. To understand all of these patterns is a large assignment towards which we can only make partial progress here.
[ Figure 6 : Commodity Specific Output, Research Spending, and Research Intensity in 2004] Comparing the right and left hand panels of Figure 6 , there is an apparent but loose concordance between the value of crop sales and the amount of public R&D spending-highervalued crops garner greater R&D spending. However, the amount of R&D spending does not rise uniformly with the value of crop sales. In Figure 6 , the most valuable crop categories (specifically corn, soybeans, and ornamentals and nursery) have especially low intensities of R&D spending compared with almost all of the lower-valued crop categories in this figure.
Turning back to Table 1 , we also see that large-acreage field crops have comparatively low public research spending per acre (and especially corn, wheat and soybeans, where less than two dollars per acre is spent on publicly performed R&D) while, for the smaller-acreage specialty crops, research spending per acre often exceeds 20 dollars, and in quite a few cases more than 40 dollars. These spending patterns suggest there may be economies of scale and size in researchsolving a production problem for one acre solves it for all similar acres for any given crop.
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The site specificity of many crop production problems means that the location matters as well as the amount of acres. Crop acreage in a given location is likely to experience the same or similar production constraints as acres for the same crop in a physically different but agroecologically similar location. Moreover, crops that are grown in close proximity are usually (but not always) more likely to share similar agroecological attributes than if they were grown in distant locations. 
The Economics of Specialty Crops R&D
This section presents theoretical arguments about the role for government in specialty crops R&D, versus other agricultural R&D, that may help explain the patterns of research investments. These arguments are supported with evidence from the literature on rates of return to different types of agricultural research and some analysis of patterns of crop-specific productivity growth and price patterns.
Economic Arguments
In the absence of other information, a first approach to allocating agricultural research resources is to use a congruence rule, as discussed by Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995, pp. 488-490) . Specifically, allocating public commodity-specific agricultural research resources strictly in proportion to the value of production (or sales) would lead to equal agricultural research intensities across all industries. Comparing specialty crops in aggregate with other crops, the agricultural research intensity for specialty crops is comparable now but has fallen in relative terms over time. Agricultural research intensities for specialty crops are comparatively low once we account for the fact that the research intensity tends to be inversely related with industry size, and the value of production of individual specialty crops is generally low.
The fact that actual agricultural research intensities are not congruent might reflect a number of factors at work. One possible interpretation is that research resources have been misallocated relative to maximizing the national social returns; that too little has been spent on specialty crops research either because of government failure owing to incomplete information, or as a reflection of the politics of research funding processes in which other commodity interests have been more influential. An alternative interpretation is that a lower public agricultural research intensity is warranted because the payoff to research on specialty crops could be expected to be comparatively low. For instance, differences in determinants of research benefits, including the size of the industry to which research results will be applicable, and differences in research costs, together mean that some industries have higher net research payoffs justifying higher rates of investment, everything else equal. This latter possibility is the focus of much of this section in which we consider theoretical arguments about the determinants of the likely payoff to public research investments, and some empirical evidence.
We do not propose to go deeply into the political economy of research funding.
However, we do note that specialty crops have some features that seem likely to have influenced the agricultural research intensities regardless of the relative payoffs to different types of research. First, producers of specialty crops may have comparatively low political influence compared with producers of some of the larger crops owing to (a) the small individual importance of each specialty crop, (b) low relative importance of specialty crops collectively in the economics and politics of the states where they are grown, and (c) the diverse interests among different specialty crops. In addition, production of individual specialty crops tends to be comparatively concentrated geographically (with many of the crops produced mostly if not entirely in one state or only a few states); thus they have limited interstate research spillover potential, which reduces the justification for federal government involvement. Finally, specialty crops agricultural research intensities may be comparatively low simply as a reflection of the effects of inertia in research spending patterns during a period when the denominator (the value of production or sales) in the agricultural research intensity ratio has been growing relatively quickly for specialty crops compared with other commodities. 11 These and other political factors should be borne in mind along with the determinants of the costs and benefits that are considered next.
Some simple economic arguments do not favor (public) investments in specialty crops research. As shown by Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) , the gross annual research benefits (GARB) to society from a given research-induced productivity gain are roughly proportional to the value of production (V): for a 100 k percent improvement in productivity, GARB ≈ kV. In addition, the benefits accruing to private researchers from certain types of (appropriable) innovations increase with increases in the acreage of production to which they will apply. Thus, other factors equal, we would expect to find a comparatively low social and private payoff to R&D on individual specialty crops owing to the comparatively small size of production in terms of both area grown and value of production. In addition, a number of specialty crops face market conditions that are different from those for the stereotypical agricultural commodity (an annual, comparatively non-perishable crop that is internationally traded and for which demand facing the United States is fairly elastic, such that changes in U.S. production would have small effects on prices) and which mean research benefits are lower for producers and the nation. In the case of a crop like almonds, for instance, California faces a comparatively inelastic demand, which means that a significant share of research benefits go to consumers, a large share of whom are not in California or the United States. Thus, for a given total benefit, the benefits to producers, the state, and the nation are smaller. In addition, the perennial crop nature of almonds means that new technologies embodied in trees or certain other capital inputs can only be adopted at the time of new planting or replanting, and this influences the distribution of benefits and the incentives of producers to spend resources on developing new technologies.
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12 Alston (2002b) discusses some general issues related to the implications of mis-matching of distributions of research benefits and costs for incentives, and refers specifically to this type of intertemporal mis-matching.
On the cost side, too, the conditions might not favor certain specialty crops research.
Achieving a given research-induced productivity gain is likely to be more expensive for perennial crops (a large proportion of the fruit and tree nut categories within specialty crops are perennial) compared with annual crops (like vegetables and field crops generally) both because the individual experimental units are larger and more expensive and because research takes longer; and possibly for other reasons related to the biology of the plants and related scientific opportunities. In addition, there are some fixed cost components to the innovation processincluding costs of compliance with regulatory processes that are onerous for pesticides and other chemical innovations and even more so for biotech crop varieties. 13 These factors mean that private research investors are less likely to find it profitable to invest in developing proprietary technologies for smaller-scale industries in general. Consequently, smaller-scale commodities are tending to become technological orphans both because of the effects of the size of the market (especially when we allow for buyer resistance to products certain types of technologies) and because of the overhead costs of R&D and regulatory compliance, both of which tend to favor research targeted towards the larger-scale commodities. Alston (2004) also makes the point, which is also relevant here, that the same factors that discourage private investment make the same investment less attractive to society as well, such that the lack of private investment does not necessarily mean that the government should invest to compensate.
These factors combined may mean that, everything else equal, we might anticipate relatively low private and social rates of return to research into specialty crops, and especially perennial crops, which could help justify a comparatively low public agricultural research intensity. But everything else is not equal, and a number of other factors could have contributed to a greater market failure and underinvestment in specialty crops research compared with 13 Kalaitzandonakes, Alston, and Bradford (2006) estimated that the costs of complying with U.S. regulations for a new biotech crop variety range between $6 million and $16 million, which is very large relative to the potential value of such technology in many of the smaller specialty crop industries.
agricultural R&D more generally. If so, everything else equal, perhaps the government should invest relatively more in specialty crops R&D to compensate or should intervene in other ways to encourage more specialty crops research.
Sources of Market Failure
Why might there be a greater market failure in specialty crops research than in other commodity-specific research? First, the basic economic arguments made above-concerning effects of scale and size of the market, and so on-might mean that the incentives for private agricultural research investments related to specialty crops, and especially perennial crops, may be even more attenuated than those related to larger scale field crops like grains, oilseeds, or cotton. Whether this is so may depend on other determinants of incentives for research investments, especially the relevant intellectual property protection and other factors that determine the extent to which the returns to invention can be appropriated, including the degree to which the industry is concentrated in the production or marketing of the commodity in question. 14 Second, other forms of market failure, other than those related to research per se, may be important for specialty crops and may mean that the social payoff to research is higher than may be indicated otherwise. Potential sources of such distortions include aspects of production (including positive and negative environmental externalities associated with landscape amenities, and pollution of air and groundwater associated with the use of agricultural chemicals and irrigation), and aspects of consumption (including negative externalities through 14 Data on concentration ratios in the food industry may be relevant. A number of specialty crops industries have cooperatives that handle a significant share of production and some have marketing orders that are authorized to conduct marketing activities and to raise funds for industry collective goods, including agricultural research (e.g., see Carman and Alston 2005) . A substantial amount of the intellectual property rights concerning plants in the United States pertain to specialty rather than field crops. Summing the total number of U.S. rights granted in the form of plant patents, varietal related utility patents, and plant variety protection certificates, Koo et al. (2007) report that only 22 percent of those rights related to cereal and oilseed crops. Specialty crops account for 71 percent of the total, with ornamental plants alone accounting for half of all the rights granted.
the healthcare and health insurance system associated with diseases and illness that may be reduced by consumption of specialty crops).
Among these possible reasons, consumption externalities are the most credible given the scale of human health problems in the United States related to diet and nutrition and the related social costs, the distortions in incentives inherent in the health care system in the presence of insurance, and the potential for specialty crops to contribute to more-healthy diets and thereby to reduce both the private and social costs of diet-related illness. The available time-series data indicate that over the period 1949-2004 farm and wholesale prices of fruits and vegetables did not fall as fast as the corresponding prices for agricultural commodities more generally and that, therefore, relative prices have moved against a healthier diet. This may have contributed to the current so-called epidemic of obesity. Of more potential relevance is the suggestion that the allocation of a greater proportion of the available research funds towards specialty crops could enhance productivity growth in, and a relative price decline for, specialty crops resulting in favorable effects on Americans' diets and significant social payoff through human health impacts. 15 The direction of these effects is clear but the quantitative importance is a matter for further research.
Rates of Return to Specialty Crops R&D
Previous studies have found a high private rate of return to agricultural research in general, and an even higher social rate of return. These findings support the argument that government intervention has been inadequate; that (even with the substantial government intervention) the observation of high rates of return means that even more money could have we excluded estimates of returns to extension. Table 3 reports some summary statistics on these selected estimates after we excluded as outliers all estimates of rates of return greater than 100 percent per annum, which were more prevalent for crops research than for specialty crops research. Appendix Table A1 contains more complete information on the studies in question.
[ It can be seen in Table 3 that the range of estimates of rates of return to specialty crops research falls generally within the range of estimates for crops research generally. As reported by Alston et al. (2000) in their meta-analysis, the signal-to-noise ratio is low such that it is difficult to identify statistically significant differences among estimates of rates of return to research according to particular characteristics of the research being evaluated-such as the nature of the commodity to which it applies. That general observation appears to apply to the comparison of returns to research on specialty crops versus other types of research. Further, the studies of research on specialty crops tended to focus on a small number of commodities (such as potatoes or certain tropical products) to the extent that the results may not be representative of the past returns to research on specialty crops in the United States, most of which were not represented in the studies cited. Thus, whilst there is no evidence from estimates of research benefits to indicate that specialty crops research has been less profitable than other types of agricultural research, nor is there any evidence from the same set of estimates to support a claim that specialty crops research was significantly more profitable and therefore inappropriately neglected.
Importantly, however, these estimates did not include any allowance for human health benefits from increased consumption of fruit and vegetables resulting from research-induced reductions in prices of fruit and vegetables. This dimension of potential benefits from research into specialty crops could be large, if research-induced price changes could be expected to contribute significantly to improved dietary quality and lower rates of obesity, and if so the rates of return may have been seriously understated. 16 Further, this factor changes the argument for public policy since some of the benefits would be associated with reductions in externalities in 16 Work has begun in this area and results to date support the view that consumption and measures of obesity such as the "body mass index" are affected by relative prices of "healthy" and "unhealthy" foods-e.g., see Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (2003) ; Philipson and Posner (2003); Ladwalla, Philipson, and Battacharya (2005); and Gelbach, Klick, and Stratmann (2007) . Further work is needed to establish and quantify the links from R&D to relative prices, from price-induced changes in consumption and obesity to health outcomes, and from there to dollar values of social costs (e.g., as done by Malla 1998, 2001) . A key point is that only very small changes in health outcomes will generate very large benefits relative to national expenditures on agricultural research. Results from Cash, Sunding, and Zilberman (2005) would support the conjecture that comparatively small research-(or subsidy-) induced changes in relative prices and consumption of fruit and vegetables would generate large net benefits through health impacts.
the health care system that would be ignored by the private sector in choosing research investments.
Prices and Productivity Growth for Specialty Crops
An examination of past changes in prices and production of specialty crops compared with other crops may yield some insight about the relative growth of supply and demand, and thus, indirectly, about the relative contributions of productivity growth among the different sectors. As shown in Figure 8 , specialty crops have grown in importance relative to other crops and livestock; the specialty crops share of agricultural output value grew from 8.7 percent in 1949 to more than 21.3 percent in 2004. 17 Within specialty crops, the value shares of both ornamentals and fruits and nuts grew a little faster than the value share of vegetables.
[ 18 As discussed by Alston, Sumner, and Vosti (2006) , and Alston, Vosti, Sumner, and Kish (2007) , some of these price increases for specialty crops might reflect premia for changes in quality, variety, or seasonal availability, which might not have been fully addressed in the indexing procedure. This possibility is a subject for continuing research, and is set aside for the time being.
the lower real price or growth in demand, or a combination of the two. The increase in production in spite of lower real producer prices indicates that productivity must have increased.
[ Figure 9 : Prices of Specialty Crops-Nominal and Real Values, 1949-2004 
] [Figure 10: Real Movement in Prices of Specialty Crops, 1949-2004 annual averages]
A first impulse may be to assume that, since prices have fallen faster for other products (i.e., field crops and livestock), the rate of productivity growth must have been comparatively slow for specialty crops, suggestive of a comparative underinvestment in productivity-enhancing research for specialty crops. However, such an interpretation may not be justified. More specific interpretations are possible if we have more information. Specifically, if we know the elasticity of supply, we can partition changes in production into those associated with changes in prices and those associated with changes in the quantity supplied; and if we know the price elasticity of demand, we can partition changes in consumption into those associated with changes in prices and those associated with changes in quantities demanded. Here, we are mainly interested in the supply side. The indexes of prices and quantity for the different categories of output grew at different rates over the period 1949 through 2004, as summarized in Table 4 . The indexes all started at 100 in 1949. By 2004 the quantity indexes had reached 212 for livestock (i.e., the index grew by 112 percent), 278 for field crops, 262 for vegetables, 283 for fruits and nuts, and 742 for nursery and greenhouse marketing. In contrast, the corresponding price indexes were 307 for livestock, 190 for field crops, 489 for vegetables, 519 for fruits and nuts, and 534 for nursery and greenhouse marketing. Dividing by the GDP deflator, which had grown from 1.0 in 1949 to 6.69 in 2004, the corresponding real price indexes were 45.9 for livestock, 28.4 for field crops, 73.1 for vegetables, 77.5 for fruits and nuts, and 79.8 for nursery and greenhouse marketing. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the relevant elasticity of supply is ε = 1.0 (a value of ε = X means that a 1 percent increase in price would call forth an X percent increase in production). A real price index of 45.9 for livestock in 2004 indicates a price decrease of 55.1 percent since 1949, which given ε = 1.0, ceteris paribus, would imply a 55.1 percent decrease in quantity supplied. Subtracting the price-induced change in quantity supplied (-55.1 percent) from the overall observed growth in quantity (112 percent) implies an increase in livestock supply of 167.1 percent (i.e., 112 -(-55.1) = 167.1 percent). Table 4 reports the corresponding computations for each category of production using an elasticity of supply of either ε = 1.0 or ε = 0.5.
[ Table 4 : Growth in Production and Prices for Agricultural Products, 1949 Products, -2004 Considering the estimates made using an elasticity of ε = 1.0, the computed growth rates of supply of vegetables as well as fruits and nuts fall in between those of livestock and field crops. Only greenhouse and nursery is outside the typical range for livestock and other crops.
When we use an elasticity of ε = 0.5 instead, the differences in the computed growth rates of supply are reduced. In either case, with the exception of nursery and greenhouse, which has been growing much faster but from a very small base, supply of specialty crops has been growing at a rate similar to that for the supply of U.S. agricultural products generally. Thus there is not a prima facie case to suggest that specialty crops have been technological orphans. Of course, we have not identified the source of the growth in supply, and it might be mostly from capital investment in fruit and nuts, and mostly from new technology in field crops, but whether that is so remains a matter of speculation for now.
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Collective Action as a Correction for Incentive Problems
A case can be made that an increase in the rate of investment in specialty crops research would be profitable for both the industry and society more generally (whether from the viewpoint of the nation or the state of California that produces many of the specialty crops 19 Data on yields per acre, or other partial productivity measures, and acreage planted to the different crops may provide some further insight into the sources of growth. This is a subject for continuing research. considered here). And, to the extent that inter-industry spillovers of technology or health-care externalities are important sources of benefits, a further case can be made for contributions by the state or federal governments to reinforce investments that the industry finds profitable to make. Industry advocates have suggested that the annual public investment should be a billion dollars, roughly twice the current amount. However, a substantially increased commitment of federal or state government funds to specialty crops research must come at the expense of other government priorities, and may be hard to secure on an enduring basis, if at all. 20 In its proposal for the 2007 Farm Bill, the USDA proposed an additional $100 million per year for specialty crops research, and even this amount may be hard to secure.
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An alternative approach, combining collective action by industry with support from government, may be more effective as a way of securing a long-term commitment of funding support, and may be a fairer and economically more efficient way to finance an increase in specialty crops research funding. Specifically, rather than intervene directly, the government could establish institutions whereby the industry itself could raise research funds using commodity levies supported by matching government grants. 22 In Australia, this approach has proven very successful as a way of locking in government support for commodity-oriented agricultural research, and has allowed substantial growth in total funding, to the point where the
Research and Development Corporations (RDCs) now drive the total agricultural research activity in Australia. 20 The gross evidence presented here does not clearly support shifting the balance of existing research resources towards specialty crops. A shift of that magnitude would not go un-noticed by the others interested in the allocation of public agricultural research resources. On the other hand, half a billion dollars is much smaller as a share of spending on farm commodity programs and the like, with recent annual spending in the range of $20 billion, more than 10 times the federal commitment to agricultural research. 22 These policies are discussed in detail by Alston and Pardey (1996) and Alston Pardey and Smith (1999) , and more recently by and James (2003, 2004) .
As documented by Carman and Alston (2005) , California specialty crops producers are quite willing to tax themselves to finance industry collective goods such as standards, inspection, research, and commodity advertising and promotion, even without the additional incentive provided by matching government grants. As shown in Table 5 , in 2002 54.8 percent of
California agricultural production was subject to a mandated marketing program; the percentage was much higher for fruits and nuts (73.5 percent), but somewhat lower for vegetables (43.1 percent). As shown in Table 6 , these programs spent over $200 million in 2002. Of that total perhaps one quarter was spent on programs for livestock and field crops, which leaves $150 million for specialty crops; but very little of that money was spent on agricultural research, in the range of one-tenth of the total.
[ Rather than simply press for an increased amount of funding for specialty crops research to be provided in the conventional fashion-to be diverted from alternative allocations on other research or from other parts of the farm bill-it might be more effective to develop a proposal for joint public-private funding of a substantial increase in specialty crops research using the Australian RDC model as a template, but perhaps in the context of the legal framework under which marketing orders and like institutions are created in the United States.
Conclusion
Specialty crops have become increasingly important relative to other categories of agricultural production in the United States over the past 50 years, especially during the past 25
years. The growth in the value of production of specialty crops has not been matched by commensurate growth in public agricultural research spending. The specialty crops share of spending on crops research (or on all agricultural research) has remained approximately constant during a period when the specialty crops share of the value of production has increased significantly. In addition, the agricultural research intensity ratio for specialty cropsexpressing research spending as a share of the corresponding value of output-changed little over the past several decades, while agricultural research intensities were rising generally. Thus, the relative intensity for specialty crops has fallen. By 2004, the R&D investment intensities for specialty and program crops were roughly equal, though for many years there was substantially more intensive R&D investment in specialty crops than in crops research generally (or program crops in particular). However, this overall picture masks a great deal of variation among crops within the category specialty crops.
Everything else equal, and in the absence of better information, research funding could be based on a congruence rule. Such a rule would dictate equal research intensities among all agricultural commodities, and to achieve this outcome would require increasing the share of spending allocated to some specialty crops (and lowering it for some others). Such a congruence rule may not be appropriate for specialty crops. Research on some specialty crops may have a relatively low private or social payoff because the acreage and value of production of individual commodities are relatively small, which limits the potential for taking advantage of economies of scale in research and in adoption of the results from research unless there are substantial economies of scope among specialty crops research projects. On the other hand, for similar reasons, the extent of market failure from private sector neglect of research opportunity may mean that there is a comparatively high social rate of return to public investment in research on specialty crops. There is limited direct evidence available to support either of these conjectures.
In 2004, a little over half a billion dollars was spent on research directly related to specialty crops, which amounted to almost 14 percent of total public agricultural research spending and a little over 20 percent of spending for public research on crops and livestock.
These recent broad allocations have been approximately consistent with a broad congruence rule.
In addition, relative growth rates of supply (or perhaps productivity) have been comparable between specialty crops and the rest of agriculture-with the exception of the very rapidly growing greenhouse and nursery products-, a pattern that is not obviously inconsistent with a balance existing in the allocation of research resources. Finally, the available evidence is consistent with a view that research on specialty crops has yielded rates of return comparable to research on other crops, though these results relate mainly to research on comparatively largescale commodities, such as potatoes. Taken together, these observations do not provide support for a major shift in the allocation of public agricultural research resources towards specialty
crops.
An additional argument can be made that research on some specialty crops may have a larger social rate of return if it makes fruit and vegetables cheaper and therefore contributes to encouraging Americans to eat healthier diets. This effect alone is not sufficient to justify a policy shift. There must also be a market distortion in health care that entails a negative externality (a social cost not borne by private individuals) that would be reduced as a result of specialty-crops research. Direct evidence on that issue is not available either, but the social costs of the health care system are sufficiently large that only a small improvement caused by research-induced dietary change would be sufficient to justify sizable increases in agricultural research spending (e.g., see Malla 1998, 2001) . One might argue, however, that, if agricultural science is to be used as an instrument of public health policy in this way, the funding ought to be provided by other arms of the government, such as the NIH, rather than by the USDA or as an earmarked component of Title 7 of the U.S. Farm Bill.
The U.S. government could act in a number of ways to enhance specialty crops research.
One option would be simply to redirect funding that would otherwise be spent on other types of agricultural research or on farm commodity programs. Alternatively, the government could seek to encourage collective action to be undertaken by commodity groups. Specialty crops producers are very actively engaged in check-off-funded programs, but they spend the lion's share of the funds they raise on commodity promotion programs. These promotion programs have been subject to controversy and litigation. The Australian government offers matching grants for levy-funded research and this policy has facilitated a very significant growth in commodityspecific research managed by producers with joint funding by industry and government. State governments could also develop programs of this type to enhance funding support for specialty crops research or, indeed, any type of commodity specific research that has a natural funding base. 1902 1908 1914 1920 1926 1932 1938 1944 1950 1956 1962 1968 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 1902 1908 1914 1920 1926 1932 1938 1944 1950 1956 1962 1968 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 Note: Nominal research expenditure data were deflated by a U.S. agricultural research price index reported in Pardey and Andersen (2007) . The data included here refer to the source of funds for all the R&D performed by the SAESs. 1915 1919 1923 1927 1931 1935 1939 1943 1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 Note: Total R&D is total commodity-specific agricultural R&D undertaken by SAES and USDA, exclusive of research on forestry, rangeland, recreation and wildlife, game birds and animals, pets, laboratory animals, aquaculture and fisheries, horses, ponies, and mules. Other stone fruits include apricots, prunes, nectarines, and so on.
Figure 4: Allocation of Public Agricultural Research Expenditures, 1975 and 2004
Source: Extracted from CRIS data tapes.
Note: Public agricultural research includes SAES and intramural USDA agricultural R&D spending, exclusive of research on forestry, rangeland, recreation and wildlife, game birds and animals, pets, laboratory animals, aquaculture and fisheries, horses, ponies, and mules. Note: Nominal research expenditure data were deflated by a U.S. agricultural research price index reported in Pardey and Andersen (2007) . Public agricultural research includes all SAES and intramural USDA spending, exclusive of research on forestry, rangeland, recreation and wildlife, game birds and animals, pets, laboratory animals, aquaculture and fisheries, horses, ponies, and mules. "Other total" includes food (not readily associated with specific plant and animal products), economic and other social science research basic R&D, and environmental and resource-related research not directly attributable to a particular commodity. 6 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Intensity ( 8 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Intensity ( Note: Here each agricultural research intensity ratio is the ratio of public agricultural research spending to the corresponding value of cash receipts. Public agricultural research includes all SAES and intramural USDA spending, exclusive of research on forestry, rangeland, recreation and wildlife, game birds and animals, pets, laboratory animals, aquaculture and fisheries, horses, ponies, and mules. Panel a includes only public research identified as commodity-specific R&D. The "Total crop" series includes all research related to a specific crop or to multiple crops, and similarly so for the "Total Livestock" series. "Total commodities" research is the sum of total crops and total livestock research. Panel b repeats the "Total commodities" series from Panel a and by way of comparison also includes the intensity of non-commodity specific R&D performed by the public sector (expressed relative to the value of cash receipts) plus the ratio of all public agricultural R&D (total commodity plus non-commodity R&D) spending and the value of cash receipts. Cash receipts exclude sales of forestry, aquaculture and fisheries products. Ostensibly, farm gate (or first point of sale) prices and quantities marketed by farms are used to form the cash receipts series. Note: SAES and intramural USDA agricultural R&D spending is exclusive of research on forestry, rangeland, recreation and wildlife, game birds and animals, pets, laboratory animals, aquaculture and fisheries, horses, ponies, and mules. Source: Extracted from data reported in Alston et al. (2000) . 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Source: Carman and Alston (2005) .
Note: Fishery and Forestry are excluded. 
